I’m still working through articles by Charles Taylor, so for now I’m mostly going to post my notes. Hopefully, a few breakthroughs will strike along the way. Mainly, what I’m getting from
Taylor is that we should use a hermeneutical approach to understand the human sciences, that common meaning is essential for understanding, and that self-definitions play a huge role in how we understand others.
“Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”
- Interpretation’s aim is to bring to light an underlying coherence of an object.
- Requirements of hermeneutics:
1. object or field of objects to be made sense of
2. distinction between the meaning and expression; meaning allows more than one expression
3. subject for whom meanings exists; without subject, choices for sameness and difference are arbitrary
- Interpretation allows us to make sense of a text through a “language of expression.” To communicate and understand interpretations we need a common understanding of the language of expressions.
- Readings of texts are based on other readings. (hermeneutic circle)
- Philosophy has demanded a level of certainly that can break through the circle and has pursued this through a rationalist approach or an empiricist approach.
- Empiricism relies on brute data, a unit which is not open to interpretation or judgment. Conclusions may be drawn by induction. If A are brute data and B are brute data, then A+B is not open to interpretation.
- Meaning has 3 requirements:
1. is for a subject
2. is of something; element is distinguishable from its meaning; substrates are substitutable
3. exists only in a field of other meanings; field of contrast
- Underlying social practices sustain hierarchical structures
- A field of meaning is bound up with a semantic field of terms that characterize meanings
- To be a living agent is to experience one’s situation in terms of certain meanings (proto-interpretation). Meanings are interpreted and shaped by the language in which the agent lives them. This whole is then interpreted by explanation.
- Reality that can’t be explained by brute data are given “subjective reality,” i.e. beliefs or values about are not interpreted but are understood as facts. Correlations are drawn between subjective realities and brute data and put in objective terms.
- We must think not of individual subjects but of inter-subjective meanings that are imbedded in practices.
- Consensus is not the same as convergence of beliefs and values.
- We can talk about a consensus of shared meaning and a consensus of a common reference world, i.e. what is significant. We may share aspirations and desires for beauty, but our interpretations of beauty will be varied.
- “Common meanings are the basis of community” (39).
- The other side of the hermeneutic circle is the “gap in intuitions” which results from a misunderstanding of others’ self definitions underlying societies.
- “As men we are self-defining beings, and we are partly what we are in virtue of the self-definitions which we have accepted.…What self-definitions we understand and what ones we do not, is closely linked with the self-definitions which help to constitute what we are” (54).
- We must not only sharpen our intuition, but also change our orientation.
- We are not only speaking of misapprehension, but rather, of illusions which are sustained by practices.
This ties in very well with
Taylor’s “Understanding and ethnocentricity”…
· There are misapprehensions about interpretive social science:
1. Understanding demands empathy. OR
2. Understanding requires one to adopt his or her point of view and speak in his or her terms, i.e. “the incorrigibility thesis”: by explaining a culture in its own terms, we rule out the possibility of showing them as wrong; each culture is incorrigible.
· And there are obvious problems of ethnocentrism, etc. inherent in applying a natural science approach to the human sciences.
· What we need is a language of “perspicuous contrast”—a way to “formulate both their way of life and ours as alternative possibilities in relation to some human constants at work in both” This is similar to Gadamer’s concept of a “fusion of horizons.”
· “Understanding is inseparable from criticism, but this in turn is inseparable from self-criticism” (131).
· We can’t understand others’ self-definitions without expanding our understanding of our own self-definitions.
· Explanatory sciences are “logically and historically dependent on our self-definitions” (131).
I think I’m most interested in thinking about library culture, its wide variety of communities, and how libraries serve as bridges between cultures by bringing texts of all kinds together and making them accessible to all members of the library community. The practices involved in American library institutions, particularly cataloging/classification, but also acquisitions and reference services, etc, definitely have a history of elitism, prejudice, and narrow self-definitions. Wiegand’s article addresses precisely this point…that library scholarship is limited by its unwillingness to engage in discourses with other fields and question such self-definitions through critical theory.
Interpretation is crucial to LIS in many ways, but most obvious to me is the role librarians play in interpreting texts, assigning headings and creating bibliographic records to make texts retrievable to potential readers who may or may not know what they are looking for. Most libraries are required to use LoC authorized headings to “describe” works in a way that is predictable to users. The most memorable exercise in my “Organization of Information” course was one in which all of my classmates and were asked to read a short paragraph and then assign a few subject headings. As one might expect, there was a wide range of headings with some of them used a great number of people and a few obscure heading used by only one person. We all brought somewhat unique interpretations, but there did seem to be an overall shared interpretation.
I’m wondering what distinguishes a “gap in intuitions” from alternative interpretations.
Taylor, C. (1985). Interpretation and the sciences of man. In Philosophy and the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Taylor, C. (1985). Understanding and ethnocentricity. In Philosophy and the human sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.